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Öğe An allocation rule with wealth-regressive tax rates(2002) Sanver, M.R.We introduce a public good allocation rule whose direct implementation by asking agents their endowments leads to Nash equilibrium outcomes-always Pareto dominating voluntary contributions outcomes. Although the Nash equilibrium allocations induced by this rule are not Pareto optimal in general, they are so in two-person economies. © 2002 Blackwell Publishers, Inc.Öğe Consensus in preference-approvals: A weighted distance approach(World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd, 2012) García-Lapresta, J.L.; Pérez-Román, D.; Erdamar, B.; Sanver, M.R.Measuring consensus level for a set of preferences requires a proper distance defined on the considered domain. We focus on preference-approvals which are extensions of ordinal preferences by the approval information. For any given set of alternatives, a preference-approval is defined by a weak ordering of the alternative set, subsets of approved and disapproved alternatives and a consistency condition. We propose a method of using weighted distances for ordering and approval components. A consensus measure based on this distance is provided which is sensitive to the position of the disagreements on ordering and approval.Öğe Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies(2005) Sanver, M.R.In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. © Springer-Verlag 2005.Öğe Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games(Elsevier, 1999) Sertel, M.R.; Sanver, M.R.This paper considers an economy with a single private and a single public good, where the preferences of the agents are common knowledge but initial endowments of the population are unknown. The public good is produced by the initial endowments of the agents. We ask what happens if a 'Lindahl government' (endowment pretension mechanism) is instituted, which directly asks the agents to reveal their initial endowments. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the allocations which would be obtained by this method at undominated Cournot (Nash) equilibria, and we determine when these allocations coincide with the allocations at a voluntary contributions equilibrium.Öğe Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity [2-s2.0-85028263989](Elsevier B.V., 2017) Núñez, M.; Sanver, M.R.We investigate the relation between monotonicity and the no-show paradox in voting rules. Although the literature has established their logical independence, we show, by presenting logical dependency results, that the two conditions are closer than a general logical independency result would suggest. Our analysis is made both under variable and fixed-size electorates. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.
