Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies
No Thumbnail Available
Date
2005
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Abstract
In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. © Springer-Verlag 2005.
Description
Keywords
Direct İmplementation, Manipulation, Performance Function, Public Goods, Voluntary Contributions Solution
Journal or Series
Review of Economic Design
WoS Q Value
Scopus Q Value
Q2
Volume
9
Issue
4
