Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2005
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. © Springer-Verlag 2005.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Direct İmplementation, Manipulation, Performance Function, Public Goods, Voluntary Contributions Solution
Kaynak
Review of Economic Design
WoS Q Değeri
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
9
Sayı
4
