Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies

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dc.authorscopusid55664622300
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M.R.
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:16:48Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:16:48Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.description.abstractIn a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. © Springer-Verlag 2005.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y
dc.identifier.endpage316en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-33645971324en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage307en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/6275
dc.identifier.volume9en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectDirect İmplementationen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectPerformance Functionen_US
dc.subjectPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subjectVoluntary Contributions Solutionen_US
dc.titleEquilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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