Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
1999
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This paper considers an economy with a single private and a single public good, where the preferences of the agents are common knowledge but initial endowments of the population are unknown. The public good is produced by the initial endowments of the agents. We ask what happens if a 'Lindahl government' (endowment pretension mechanism) is instituted, which directly asks the agents to reveal their initial endowments. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the allocations which would be obtained by this method at undominated Cournot (Nash) equilibria, and we determine when these allocations coincide with the allocations at a voluntary contributions equilibrium.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Games Of Pretension, H41, Lindahl Solution, Manipulation Via Hiding Of Endowments, Undominated Nash Equilibrium, Voluntary Contributions Equilibrium
Kaynak
European Journal of Political Economy
WoS Q Değeri
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
15
Sayı
2
