Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.authorscopusid6701564849
dc.authorscopusid55664622300
dc.contributor.authorSertel, M.R.
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M.R.
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:16:51Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:16:51Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers an economy with a single private and a single public good, where the preferences of the agents are common knowledge but initial endowments of the population are unknown. The public good is produced by the initial endowments of the agents. We ask what happens if a 'Lindahl government' (endowment pretension mechanism) is instituted, which directly asks the agents to reveal their initial endowments. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the allocations which would be obtained by this method at undominated Cournot (Nash) equilibria, and we determine when these allocations coincide with the allocations at a voluntary contributions equilibrium.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipBoğaziçi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.sponsorshipA preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Seminar in Economic Design, April, 1994, Boğaziçi University, and at the 17th Bosphorus Workshop on Economic Design, August 1994. We benefited from useful comments of Ahmet Alkan, Semih Koray and Muhamet Yıldız. We would also like to thank two anonymous referees whose comments helped to improve the paper. Remzi Sanver also thanks the Boğaziçi University Foundation (BUVAK) which supported his research.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00040-8
dc.identifier.endpage162en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-2680
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-0345826654en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage149en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00040-8
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/6297
dc.identifier.volume15en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Political Economyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectGames Of Pretensionen_US
dc.subjectH41en_US
dc.subjectLindahl Solutionen_US
dc.subjectManipulation Via Hiding Of Endowmentsen_US
dc.subjectUndominated Nash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectVoluntary Contributions Equilibriumen_US
dc.titleEquilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Dosyalar

Koleksiyon

Scopus Indexed Publications