An allocation rule with wealth-regressive tax rates
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Tarih
2002
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info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We introduce a public good allocation rule whose direct implementation by asking agents their endowments leads to Nash equilibrium outcomes-always Pareto dominating voluntary contributions outcomes. Although the Nash equilibrium allocations induced by this rule are not Pareto optimal in general, they are so in two-person economies. © 2002 Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynak
Journal of Public Economic Theory
WoS Q Değeri
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
4
Sayı
1
