An allocation rule with wealth-regressive tax rates

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dc.authorscopusid55664622300
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M.R.
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:17:12Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:17:12Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a public good allocation rule whose direct implementation by asking agents their endowments leads to Nash equilibrium outcomes-always Pareto dominating voluntary contributions outcomes. Although the Nash equilibrium allocations induced by this rule are not Pareto optimal in general, they are so in two-person economies. © 2002 Blackwell Publishers, Inc.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1467-9779.00088
dc.identifier.endpage69en_US
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-1642596998en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage63en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00088
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/6442
dc.identifier.volume4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Public Economic Theoryen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleAn allocation rule with wealth-regressive tax rates
dc.typeArticle

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