Kemeny Consistency Of Social Welfare Functions
Yükleniyor...
Tarih
2010
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
Erişim Hakkı
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
We introduce a consistency condition for social welfare functions; called Kemeny stability. This notion rests upon the Kemeny distance for rankings and a preference scheme, hyper-preferences as we call. It’s been studied what rules satisfy this stability condition and which rules don’t. We considered different ways of proposing this condition. As a result of our research, it’s been shown that no scoring rule satisfies the condition of Kemeny stability. On the other hand, we found out that there exists Condorcet type social welfare functions which satisfy our condition. On the other hand, general characteristics of the rules satisfying the condition also has been studied and some results are achieved. In this context, a strong neutrality condition is shown to be sufficient. A literature search related to all these aspects also accomplished and presented in this work.
