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    Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
    (Elsevier Science Bv, 2002) Sertel, MR; Özkal-Sanver, I
    We consider matching problems with endowments and analyze the manipulability of the men-optimal and the women-optimal matching rule via hiding, perfect hiding, destruction, and predonation of endowments. We show that the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule is manipulable by women (resp., men) via both types of hiding, as well as by destruction and by predonation of their endowments. In contrast, so long as the hidden part of one's endowment cannot be consumed alone, a man (resp., woman) can manipulate the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule only by predonating a portion of his (resp., her) initial endowment (to men or women). We consider the manipulability of matching rules under monotonic consumption rules. We show that the men-optimal matching rule is non-manipulable via hiding by a man under any monotonic consumption rule. We also characterize the maximal subclass of monotonic consumption rules under which a woman can manipulate the men-optimal matching rule via destruction (or via hiding). We offer a similar analysis for the manipulability of the men-optimal matching rule via perfect hiding. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
    (Springer, 2004) Sertel, MR; Sanver, MR
    We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class of such social choice functions is quite broad, including every t-refinement of the Plurality Rule, Plurality with a Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise and the Single Transferable Vote, i.e., any selection from either of these social choice rules which is obtained via tie-breaking among candidates according to any total order t on the set of alternatives. As announced in our title, the strong equilibrium outcomes of the voting games determined by such social choice functions turn out to be nothing but generalized Condorcet winners, namely the (n,q)-Condorcet winners. In the case of social choice functions (such as those just listed) which are furthermore top-majoritarian, they coincide with the classical Condorcet winners.