Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2002
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier Science Bv
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider matching problems with endowments and analyze the manipulability of the men-optimal and the women-optimal matching rule via hiding, perfect hiding, destruction, and predonation of endowments. We show that the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule is manipulable by women (resp., men) via both types of hiding, as well as by destruction and by predonation of their endowments. In contrast, so long as the hidden part of one's endowment cannot be consumed alone, a man (resp., woman) can manipulate the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule only by predonating a portion of his (resp., her) initial endowment (to men or women). We consider the manipulability of matching rules under monotonic consumption rules. We show that the men-optimal matching rule is non-manipulable via hiding by a man under any monotonic consumption rule. We also characterize the maximal subclass of monotonic consumption rules under which a woman can manipulate the men-optimal matching rule via destruction (or via hiding). We offer a similar analysis for the manipulability of the men-optimal matching rule via perfect hiding. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Matching, Endowments, Manipulation, Manipulation, Stability
Kaynak
Mathematical Social Sciences
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
44
Sayı
1
