Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments

dc.contributor.authorSertel, MR
dc.contributor.authorÖzkal-Sanver, I
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:56:53Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:56:53Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider matching problems with endowments and analyze the manipulability of the men-optimal and the women-optimal matching rule via hiding, perfect hiding, destruction, and predonation of endowments. We show that the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule is manipulable by women (resp., men) via both types of hiding, as well as by destruction and by predonation of their endowments. In contrast, so long as the hidden part of one's endowment cannot be consumed alone, a man (resp., woman) can manipulate the men- (resp., women-) optimal matching rule only by predonating a portion of his (resp., her) initial endowment (to men or women). We consider the manipulability of matching rules under monotonic consumption rules. We show that the men-optimal matching rule is non-manipulable via hiding by a man under any monotonic consumption rule. We also characterize the maximal subclass of monotonic consumption rules under which a woman can manipulate the men-optimal matching rule via destruction (or via hiding). We offer a similar analysis for the manipulability of the men-optimal matching rule via perfect hiding. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00007-0
dc.identifier.endpage83en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.issn1879-3118
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-0036347179en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage65en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00007-0
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/8875
dc.identifier.volume44en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000177661100006en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bven_US
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectMatchingen_US
dc.subjectEndowmentsen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectStabilityen_US
dc.titleManipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowmentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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