Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2004
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class of such social choice functions is quite broad, including every t-refinement of the Plurality Rule, Plurality with a Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise and the Single Transferable Vote, i.e., any selection from either of these social choice rules which is obtained via tie-breaking among candidates according to any total order t on the set of alternatives. As announced in our title, the strong equilibrium outcomes of the voting games determined by such social choice functions turn out to be nothing but generalized Condorcet winners, namely the (n,q)-Condorcet winners. In the case of social choice functions (such as those just listed) which are furthermore top-majoritarian, they coincide with the classical Condorcet winners.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Subgame Perfect Implementation, Nash Implementation, Allocations, Mechanisms
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
22
Sayı
2
