Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorSertel, MR
dc.contributor.authorSanver, MR
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:26Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:26Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class of such social choice functions is quite broad, including every t-refinement of the Plurality Rule, Plurality with a Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise and the Single Transferable Vote, i.e., any selection from either of these social choice rules which is obtained via tie-breaking among candidates according to any total order t on the set of alternatives. As announced in our title, the strong equilibrium outcomes of the voting games determined by such social choice functions turn out to be nothing but generalized Condorcet winners, namely the (n,q)-Condorcet winners. In the case of social choice functions (such as those just listed) which are furthermore top-majoritarian, they coincide with the classical Condorcet winners.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-003-0218-x
dc.identifier.endpage347en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-1642602820en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage331en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0218-x
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7114
dc.identifier.volume22en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000189207000004en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectSubgame Perfect Implementationen_US
dc.subjectNash Implementationen_US
dc.subjectAllocationsen_US
dc.subjectMechanismsen_US
dc.titleStrong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winnersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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