Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
| dc.authorwosid | Sanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Remzi | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:40:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:40:26Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 471 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0938-2259 | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-62949090005 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 461 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7110 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 39 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000264320500006 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wosquality | Q3 | en_US |
| dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
| dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Economic Theory | en_US |
| dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
| dc.subject | Plurality Rule | en_US |
| dc.subject | Strategy-Proofness | en_US |
| dc.subject | Domain Restrictions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Social Choice Functions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Manipulatability | en_US |
| dc.subject | Manipulation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Committees | en_US |
| dc.subject | Schemes | en_US |
| dc.title | Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
