Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2009
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Plurality Rule, Strategy-Proofness, Domain Restrictions, Social Choice Functions, Manipulatability, Manipulation, Committees, Schemes
Kaynak
Economic Theory
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
39
Sayı
3
