The basic approval voting game
Yükleniyor...
Tarih
2010
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
ABSTRACT: We survey results about Approval Voting obtained within the standard framework of game theory. Restricting the set of strategies to undominated and sincere ballots does not help to predict Approval Voting outcomes, which is also the case under strategic equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium and its usual reÖnements. Strong Nash equilibrium in general does not exist but predicts the election of a Condorcet winner when one exists.
Açıklama
15 pages
Anahtar Kelimeler
PLURALITY RULE
Kaynak
Handbook on approval voting
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
