The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives

dc.authoridSalles, Maurice/0000-0003-2635-9794
dc.contributor.authorSalles, Maurice
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:37Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractSocial choice functions are generalized to handle Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z
dc.identifier.endpage311en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue1.Şuben_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85141640302en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage299en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7134
dc.identifier.volume60en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000880501300001en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleThe possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives
dc.typeArticle

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