The possibility of generalized social choice functions and Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives

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Date

2023

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Springer

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info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess

DOI

10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z

Abstract

Social choice functions are generalized to handle Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives. Possibility and impossibility results are established.

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Social Choice and Welfare

WoS Q Value

Q4

Scopus Q Value

Q1

Volume

60

Issue

1.Şub

Citation

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01437-z
 https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7134

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info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess