Emotions and Evaluative Judgments

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.contributor.authorTurner, Zeynep Talay
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:06:40Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:06:40Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.departmentİstanbul Billgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractThere has been an ongoing debate on whether emotions are evaluative judgments, and as such cognitive.Though philosophers, who commit themselves to the idea that emotions are constituted or structured byevaluative judgments, provide us with very rich accounts of the nature of emotions, they downplay itsethical dimension. In order to correct this we should focus on particular emotions. Here I focus oncompassion and conclude that though there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluativejudgments this is not necessarily a one-sided one. Finally, I claim that any suspension of judgment(Arendt on Eichmann) can lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I aminterested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the suspension of judgment andaccordingly of emotions, it is much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly anysense of accountability.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.20981/kaygi.472918
dc.identifier.endpage56en_US
dc.identifier.issn1303-4251
dc.identifier.issn2645-8950
dc.identifier.issue31en_US
dc.identifier.startpage42en_US
dc.identifier.trdizinid326936en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.20981/kaygi.472918
dc.identifier.urihttps://search.trdizin.gov.tr/yayin/detay/326936
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/5543
dc.identifier.volume0en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakTR-Dizinen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofKaygı. Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisien_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Ulusal Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.titleEmotions and Evaluative Judgmentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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