Emotions and Evaluative Judgments

Abstract

There has been an ongoing debate on whether emotions are evaluative judgments, and as such cognitive.Though philosophers, who commit themselves to the idea that emotions are constituted or structured byevaluative judgments, provide us with very rich accounts of the nature of emotions, they downplay itsethical dimension. In order to correct this we should focus on particular emotions. Here I focus oncompassion and conclude that though there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluativejudgments this is not necessarily a one-sided one. Finally, I claim that any suspension of judgment(Arendt on Eichmann) can lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I aminterested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the suspension of judgment andaccordingly of emotions, it is much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly anysense of accountability.