Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorSanver, MR
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:26Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:26Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractBy a slight generalization of the definition of implementation (called implementation by awards), Maskin monotonicity is no more needed for Nash implementation. In fact, a weaker condition, to which we refer as almost monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for social choice correspondences to be Nash implementable by awards. Hence our framework paves the way to the Nash implementation of social choice rules which otherwise fail to be Nash implementable. In particular, the Pareto social choice rule, the majority rule and the strong core are almost monotonic (hence Nash implementable by awards) while they are not Maskin monotonic (hence fail to be Nash implementable in the standard framework).en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5
dc.identifier.endpage460en_US
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-23344454354en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage453en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0626-5
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7109
dc.identifier.volume28en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000230462600011en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Theoryen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectMaskin Monotonicityen_US
dc.subjectNo Veto Poweren_US
dc.subjectNash İmplementationen_US
dc.subjectMechanism Designen_US
dc.subjectEquilibriumen_US
dc.titleNash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awardsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Dosyalar