Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards

Küçük Resim Yok

Tarih

2006

Yazarlar

Dergi Başlığı

Dergi ISSN

Cilt Başlığı

Yayıncı

Springer

Erişim Hakkı

info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess

Özet

By a slight generalization of the definition of implementation (called implementation by awards), Maskin monotonicity is no more needed for Nash implementation. In fact, a weaker condition, to which we refer as almost monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient for social choice correspondences to be Nash implementable by awards. Hence our framework paves the way to the Nash implementation of social choice rules which otherwise fail to be Nash implementable. In particular, the Pareto social choice rule, the majority rule and the strong core are almost monotonic (hence Nash implementable by awards) while they are not Maskin monotonic (hence fail to be Nash implementable in the standard framework).

Açıklama

Anahtar Kelimeler

Maskin Monotonicity, No Veto Power, Nash İmplementation, Mechanism Design, Equilibrium

Kaynak

Economic Theory

WoS Q Değeri

Q3

Scopus Q Değeri

Q1

Cilt

28

Sayı

2

Künye