SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.contributor.authorMartin, Mathieu
dc.contributor.authorSalles, Maurice
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:48:47Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:48:47Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219198913400124
dc.identifier.issn0219-1989
dc.identifier.issn1793-6675
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84881167049en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ4en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198913400124
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7928
dc.identifier.volume15en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000216821700003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWorld Scientific Publ Co Pte Ltden_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Game Theory Reviewen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choiceen_US
dc.subjectAggregation Functionsen_US
dc.subjectVoting Gamesen_US
dc.subjectStability Seten_US
dc.subjectMajorityen_US
dc.subjectExistenceen_US
dc.subjectWelfareen_US
dc.subjectRulesen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.titleSOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONSen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Dosyalar

Koleksiyon

Web of Science Indexed Publications
Scopus Indexed Publications