SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2013
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
World Scientific Publ Co Pte Ltd
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Social Choice, Aggregation Functions, Voting Games, Stability Set, Majority, Existence, Welfare, Rules, Core
Kaynak
International Game Theory Review
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Q4
Cilt
15
Sayı
3
