Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems

dc.contributor.authorÖzkal-Sanver, I
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:17Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:17Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe define two versions of stability and efficiency of partitions and analyze their relationships for some matching rules. The stability and efficiency of a partition depends on the matching rule phi. The results are stated under various membership property rights axioms. It is shown that in a world where agents can freely exit from and enter coalitions, whenever the matching rule is individually rational and Pareto optimal, the set of phi-stable and phi-efficient partitions coincide and it is unique: the grand coalition. Then we define a weaker version of stability and efficiency, namely specific to a given preference profile and find some negative results for stable matching rules.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11238-005-0945-9
dc.identifier.endpage205en_US
dc.identifier.issn0040-5833
dc.identifier.issn1573-7187
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-27844495620en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage193en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-0945-9
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7225
dc.identifier.volume59en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000233396000002en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofTheory and Decisionen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectMatchingen_US
dc.subjectPartitionsen_US
dc.subjectMembership Property Rightsen_US
dc.subjectStabilityen_US
dc.subjectEfficiencyen_US
dc.subjectCoreen_US
dc.titleStability and efficiency of partitions in matching problemsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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