Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2005
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We define two versions of stability and efficiency of partitions and analyze their relationships for some matching rules. The stability and efficiency of a partition depends on the matching rule phi. The results are stated under various membership property rights axioms. It is shown that in a world where agents can freely exit from and enter coalitions, whenever the matching rule is individually rational and Pareto optimal, the set of phi-stable and phi-efficient partitions coincide and it is unique: the grand coalition. Then we define a weaker version of stability and efficiency, namely specific to a given preference profile and find some negative results for stable matching rules.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Matching, Partitions, Membership Property Rights, Stability, Efficiency, Core
Kaynak
Theory and Decision
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
59
Sayı
3
