Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorSanver, MR
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:56:53Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:56:53Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractI show that there exists no scoring rule which ensures that an alternative considered as best by a strict majority is chosen while an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority remains outside of the choice set. The negative result is valid for standard scoring rules where scores depend on the number of alternatives only, as well as for generalized ones defined via vectors of scores which are functions of both the number of alternatives and agents. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science BY. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00087-7
dc.identifier.endpage155en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-0036167653en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage151en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00087-7
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/8874
dc.identifier.volume43en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000174017600003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bven_US
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectScoring Rulesen_US
dc.subjectRespecting Majorityen_US
dc.titleScoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
dc.typeArticle

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