Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2002
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier Science Bv
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
I show that there exists no scoring rule which ensures that an alternative considered as best by a strict majority is chosen while an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority remains outside of the choice set. The negative result is valid for standard scoring rules where scores depend on the number of alternatives only, as well as for generalized ones defined via vectors of scores which are functions of both the number of alternatives and agents. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science BY. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Scoring Rules, Respecting Majority
Kaynak
Mathematical Social Sciences
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
43
Sayı
2
