On combining implementable social choice rules
| dc.authorid | Benoit, Jean-Pierre/0000-0002-8173-2793; | |
| dc.authorwosid | Benoit, Jean-Pierre/AGV-9044-2022 | |
| dc.authorwosid | Sanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019 | |
| dc.authorwosid | Benoit, Jean-Pierre/K-3218-2015 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Benoit, Jean Pierre | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ok, Efe A. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Rerazi | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:42:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:42:43Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
| dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 30 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1090-2473 | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-34249013199 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 20 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7375 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 60 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000248187600002 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wosquality | Q1 | en_US |
| dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
| dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | en_US |
| dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nash İmplementation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Dominant Strategy İmplementation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Maskin Monotonicity | en_US |
| dc.subject | Minimal Monotonic Extension | en_US |
| dc.subject | Largest İmplementable Subcorrespondence | en_US |
| dc.title | On combining implementable social choice rules | |
| dc.type | Article |
