On combining implementable social choice rules
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2007
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Nash İmplementation, Dominant Strategy İmplementation, Maskin Monotonicity, Minimal Monotonic Extension, Largest İmplementable Subcorrespondence
Kaynak
Games and Economic Behavior
WoS Q Değeri
Q1
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
60
Sayı
1
