On combining implementable social choice rules
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Date
2007
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Abstract
We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Description
Keywords
Nash İmplementation, Dominant Strategy İmplementation, Maskin Monotonicity, Minimal Monotonic Extension, Largest İmplementable Subcorrespondence
Journal or Series
Games and Economic Behavior
WoS Q Value
Q1
Scopus Q Value
Q1
Volume
60
Issue
1
