Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
dc.authorid | LAINE, Jean/0000-0002-7305-7556|Aslan, Fatma/0000-0003-1577-8109 | |
dc.contributor.author | Aslan, Fatma | |
dc.contributor.author | Laine, Jean | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:42:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:42:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and nontransferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | National Research, Development and Innovation Fund [TUDFO/51757/2019-ITM]; (Thematic Excellence Program) | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | The research reported in this paper has been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund (TUDFO/51757/2019-ITM, Thematic Excellence Program). | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 78 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-4068 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1873-1538 | |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85085313541 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q2 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 66 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7420 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 89 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000539285400008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wosquality | Q4 | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Science Sa | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Mathematical Economics | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Shapley-Scarf Markets | en_US |
dc.subject | Competitive Equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | Couples | en_US |
dc.subject | Externalities | en_US |
dc.subject | One Matching Markets | en_US |
dc.subject | Incentive Compatibility | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategy-Proofness | en_US |
dc.subject | Preferences | en_US |
dc.subject | Stability | en_US |
dc.subject | Economy | en_US |
dc.subject | Core | en_US |
dc.subject | Externalities | en_US |
dc.title | Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |