Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2020
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier Science Sa
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and nontransferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Shapley-Scarf Markets, Competitive Equilibrium, Couples, Externalities, One Matching Markets, Incentive Compatibility, Strategy-Proofness, Preferences, Stability, Economy, Core, Externalities
Kaynak
Journal of Mathematical Economics
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
89
