Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorCoban, Ceyhun
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:36Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:36Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12:259-272, 1976) and Baigent (J Econ 47(4):407-411, 1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (J Econ 5:478-486, 1972) type vanishes.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0
dc.identifier.endpage961en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue4en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84911966502en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage953en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7127
dc.identifier.volume43en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000345339100008en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleSocial choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
dc.typeArticle

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