Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2014
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12:259-272, 1976) and Baigent (J Econ 47(4):407-411, 1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (J Econ 5:478-486, 1972) type vanishes.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
43
Sayı
4
