Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences

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dc.contributor.authorExadaktylos, Filippos
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-16T09:01:04Z
dc.date.available2021-06-16T09:01:04Z
dc.date.issued2013-11
dc.description.abstractWe show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior. © 2013.en_US
dc.fullTextLevelFull Texten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.021en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84883797711en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/3786
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.021
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000326614200024en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.issue2en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.nationalInternationalen_US
dc.numberofauthors3en_US
dc.pages236 - 238en_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectAltruismen_US
dc.subjectDictator gameen_US
dc.subjectOther-regarding preferencesen_US
dc.subjectSelfishnessen_US
dc.subjectUltimatum gameen_US
dc.titleAccepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferencesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.volume121en_US

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