Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences
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Dosyalar
Tarih
2013-11
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
We show that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer to zero in an ultimatum game are the most generous players in a dictator game. This finding challenges the interpretation of the acceptance of low offers as payoff-maximizing behavior. © 2013.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Altruism, Dictator game, Other-regarding preferences, Selfishness, Ultimatum game
Kaynak
Economics Letters
WoS Q Değeri
Q2
