Ensuring pareto optimality by referendum voting

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorOzkal-Sanver, Ipek
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:27Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:27Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description7th International Meeting of the Society-for-Social-Choice-and-Welfare -- JUL 22-25, 2004 -- Osaka, JAPANen_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except in the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSoc Social Choice & Welfareen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7
dc.identifier.endpage219en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issn1432-217X
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-33947616714en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage211en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7117
dc.identifier.volume27en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000240438900014en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleEnsuring pareto optimality by referendum votingen_US
dc.typeConference Objecten_US

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