Ensuring pareto optimality by referendum voting
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2006
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider a society confronting the decision of accepting or rejecting a list of (at least two) proposals. Assuming separability of preferences, we show the impossibility of guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes through anonymous referendum voting, except in the case of an odd number of voters confronting precisely two proposals. In this special case, majority voting is the only anonymous social choice rule which guarantees Pareto optimal referendum outcomes.
Açıklama
7th International Meeting of the Society-for-Social-Choice-and-Welfare -- JUL 22-25, 2004 -- Osaka, JAPAN
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q4
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
27
Sayı
1
