Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching markets
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Tarih
2007
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi
Erişim Hakkı
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Özet
Özkal-Sanver (2005) studies stability and efficiency of partitions of agents in two-sided matching markets where agents are allowed to form partitions only by individual moves, and within each coalition of a partition a matching rule determines the matching. In this thesis, first we introduce some of the papers in the literature relating to this topic with their results. Then, we present Nizamoğulları and Özkal-Sanver (2007)’s work in which the relationship between stability and efficiency of partitions is analyzed for several matching rules and under various membership property rights codes, now allowing coalitional moves.
