Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
| dc.authorid | Ertemel, Sinan/0000-0003-0089-4641|Kutlu, Levent/0000-0003-2240-1967 | |
| dc.authorwosid | Ertemel, Sinan/ABE-8230-2020 | |
| dc.authorwosid | Sanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019 | |
| dc.authorwosid | Kutlu, Levent/A-3206-2008 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Ertemel, Sinan | |
| dc.contributor.author | Kutlu, Levent | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Remzi | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-18T20:40:36Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-07-18T20:40:36Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.department | İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331-347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9 | |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 201 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0176-1714 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1432-217X | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84937525609 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 187 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0872-9 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/7129 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 45 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000358219600008 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wosquality | Q3 | en_US |
| dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
| dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Social Choice and Welfare | en_US |
| dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
| dc.subject | Effectivity Functions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Condorcet Winners | en_US |
| dc.subject | Equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.subject | Manipulation | en_US |
| dc.subject | Schemes | en_US |
| dc.title | Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences | |
| dc.type | Article |
