Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2015
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
A resolute social choice correspondence is a social choice rule which maps preference profiles into sets of mutually compatible outcomes. We consider a fairly large class of resolute social choice correspondences and characterize the strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of their voting games in terms of a generalization of the Condorcet principle. Our findings generalize those of Sertel and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 22:331-347, 2004) who address the same question in a more restricted framework.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Effectivity Functions, Condorcet Winners, Equilibrium, Manipulation, Schemes
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
45
Sayı
1
