Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting

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dc.authoridDindar, Hayrullah/0000-0001-6724-2045
dc.authorwosidDindar, Hayrullah/L-6020-2018
dc.contributor.authorAslan, Fatma
dc.contributor.authorDindar, Hayrullah
dc.contributor.authorLaine, Jean
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:04Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:04Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description1st Joint Meeting of the 19th Annual International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) / Behavioral OR Conference -- JUN 11-15, 2019 -- Loughborough Univ, Loughborough, ENGLANDen_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider the elections of a seat-posted committee, and investigate the propensity of seat-wise majority voting to choose a committee that fulfills the majority will with respect to preferences over committees. Voters have seat-wise preferences and preferences over committees are derived from seat-wise preferences by means of a neutral preference extension. Neutrality means that the names of candidates do not play any role. The majority committee paradox refers to a situation where a Condorcet winner exists for each seat, and a Condorcet winner committee also exists but does not coincide with the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners. The majority committee weak paradox refers to a situation where the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners is not a Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domains of preference extensions immune to each of the paradoxes.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCNRS PICS program (Universite de Caen Normandie) [08001]; CNRS PICS program (Istanbul Bilgi University)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe first author is grateful to the CNRS PICS program 08001 (Universite de Caen Normandie and Istanbul Bilgi University) for its financial support.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_3
dc.identifier.endpage42en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-030-21711-2
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-030-21710-5
dc.identifier.issn1865-1348
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85067308795en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage33en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21711-2_3
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/6958
dc.identifier.volume351en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000561020200003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer-Verlag Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofGroup Decision and Negotiation: Behavior, Models, and Support, Gdn 2019en_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectCommittee Electionen_US
dc.subjectVoting Paradoxesen_US
dc.subjectMajority Votingen_US
dc.subjectSeparable Preferencesen_US
dc.subjectOstrogorski Paradoxen_US
dc.subjectTheoremen_US
dc.titleChoosing a Committee Under Majority Voting
dc.typeConference Object

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