Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2019
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer-Verlag Berlin
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We consider the elections of a seat-posted committee, and investigate the propensity of seat-wise majority voting to choose a committee that fulfills the majority will with respect to preferences over committees. Voters have seat-wise preferences and preferences over committees are derived from seat-wise preferences by means of a neutral preference extension. Neutrality means that the names of candidates do not play any role. The majority committee paradox refers to a situation where a Condorcet winner exists for each seat, and a Condorcet winner committee also exists but does not coincide with the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners. The majority committee weak paradox refers to a situation where the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners is not a Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domains of preference extensions immune to each of the paradoxes.
Açıklama
1st Joint Meeting of the 19th Annual International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) / Behavioral OR Conference -- JUN 11-15, 2019 -- Loughborough Univ, Loughborough, ENGLAND
Anahtar Kelimeler
Committee Election, Voting Paradoxes, Majority Voting, Separable Preferences, Ostrogorski Paradox, Theorem
Kaynak
Group Decision and Negotiation: Behavior, Models, and Support, Gdn 2019
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
351
