Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences

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dc.authoridOzyurt, Selcuk/0000-0002-3326-5238;
dc.authorwosidOzyurt, Selcuk/AAF-8431-2020
dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorOezyurt, Selcuk
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:40:28Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:40:28Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe qualify a social choice correspondence as resolute when its set valued outcomes are interpreted as mutually compatible alternatives which are altogether chosen. We refer to such sets as committees and analyze the manipulability of resolute social choice correspondences which pick fixed size committees. When the domain of preferences over committees is unrestricted, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem-naturally-applies. We show that in case we wish to reasonably relate preferences over committees to preferences over committee members, there is no domain restriction which allows escaping Gibbard-Satterthwaite type of impossibilities. We also consider a more general model where the range of the social choice rule is determined by imposing a lower and an upper bound on the cardinalities of the committees. The results are again of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite taste, though under more restrictive extension axioms.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00355-007-0223-6
dc.identifier.endpage101en_US
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-36448930161en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage89en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0223-6
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7120
dc.identifier.volume30en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000251175100006en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectManipulationen_US
dc.subjectExtensionen_US
dc.subjectRulesen_US
dc.titleStrategy-proof resolute social choice correspondencesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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