Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
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Date
2008
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Abstract
We qualify a social choice correspondence as resolute when its set valued outcomes are interpreted as mutually compatible alternatives which are altogether chosen. We refer to such sets as committees and analyze the manipulability of resolute social choice correspondences which pick fixed size committees. When the domain of preferences over committees is unrestricted, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem-naturally-applies. We show that in case we wish to reasonably relate preferences over committees to preferences over committee members, there is no domain restriction which allows escaping Gibbard-Satterthwaite type of impossibilities. We also consider a more general model where the range of the social choice rule is determined by imposing a lower and an upper bound on the cardinalities of the committees. The results are again of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite taste, though under more restrictive extension axioms.
Description
Keywords
Manipulation, Extension, Rules
Journal or Series
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Value
Q3
Scopus Q Value
Q1
Volume
30
Issue
1
