Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2008
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Springer
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We qualify a social choice correspondence as resolute when its set valued outcomes are interpreted as mutually compatible alternatives which are altogether chosen. We refer to such sets as committees and analyze the manipulability of resolute social choice correspondences which pick fixed size committees. When the domain of preferences over committees is unrestricted, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem-naturally-applies. We show that in case we wish to reasonably relate preferences over committees to preferences over committee members, there is no domain restriction which allows escaping Gibbard-Satterthwaite type of impossibilities. We also consider a more general model where the range of the social choice rule is determined by imposing a lower and an upper bound on the cardinalities of the committees. The results are again of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite taste, though under more restrictive extension axioms.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Manipulation, Extension, Rules
Kaynak
Social Choice and Welfare
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q1
Cilt
30
Sayı
1
