A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions

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dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorOzkal-Sanver, Ipek
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:17Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:17Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.descriptionEGIDE-Picasso Workshop -- 2008 -- Univ Basque Country, Bilbao, SPAINen_US
dc.description.abstractWe identify a new monotonicity condition (called cover monotonicity) for tournament solutions which allows a discrimination among main tournament solutions: The top-cycle, the iterated uncovered set, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set are cover monotonic while the uncovered set, Banks set, the Copeland rule, and the Slater rule fail to be so. As cover monotonic tournament solutions induce social choice rules which are Nash implementable in certain non-standard frameworks (such as those set by Bochet and Maniquet (CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/84, 2006) or A-zkal-Sanver and Sanver (Social Choice and Welfare, 26(3), 607-623, 2006), the discrimination generated by cover monotonicity becomes particularly notable when implementability is a concern.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11238-009-9159-x
dc.identifier.endpage452en_US
dc.identifier.issn0040-5833
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-77955926001en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage439en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9159-x
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7229
dc.identifier.volume69en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000280074600006en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofTheory and Decisionen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectTournamentsen_US
dc.subjectMonotonicityen_US
dc.subjectCondorcet Consistencyen_US
dc.subjectNash İmplementationen_US
dc.subjectNash Implementationen_US
dc.subjectEquilibriumen_US
dc.subjectRulesen_US
dc.subjectSeten_US
dc.titleA new monotonicity condition for tournament solutionsen_US
dc.typeConference Objecten_US

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