A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
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Date
2010
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Abstract
We identify a new monotonicity condition (called cover monotonicity) for tournament solutions which allows a discrimination among main tournament solutions: The top-cycle, the iterated uncovered set, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set are cover monotonic while the uncovered set, Banks set, the Copeland rule, and the Slater rule fail to be so. As cover monotonic tournament solutions induce social choice rules which are Nash implementable in certain non-standard frameworks (such as those set by Bochet and Maniquet (CORE Discussion Paper No. 2006/84, 2006) or A-zkal-Sanver and Sanver (Social Choice and Welfare, 26(3), 607-623, 2006), the discrimination generated by cover monotonicity becomes particularly notable when implementability is a concern.
Description
EGIDE-Picasso Workshop -- 2008 -- Univ Basque Country, Bilbao, SPAIN
Keywords
Tournaments, Monotonicity, Condorcet Consistency, Nash İmplementation, Nash Implementation, Equilibrium, Rules, Set
Journal or Series
Theory and Decision
WoS Q Value
Q3
Scopus Q Value
Q2
Volume
69
Issue
3
