Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains

dc.authorwosidSanver, M. Remzi/G-2339-2019
dc.contributor.authorSanver, M. Remzi
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T20:42:32Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T20:42:32Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.departmentİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractWe give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is Nash implementable. We show that the plurality rule fails Nash implementability on every domain except those which are monotonically trivial. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.016
dc.identifier.endpage300en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-42649091481en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage298en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.07.016
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11411/7325
dc.identifier.volume99en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000256234800022en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ3en_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Saen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectPluralityen_US
dc.subjectMaskin Monotoncityen_US
dc.subjectNash İmplementationen_US
dc.subjectDomain Restrictionen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-Proofnessen_US
dc.titleNash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domainsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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