Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2008
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Elsevier Science Sa
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is Nash implementable. We show that the plurality rule fails Nash implementability on every domain except those which are monotonically trivial. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Plurality, Maskin Monotoncity, Nash İmplementation, Domain Restriction, Strategy-Proofness
Kaynak
Economics Letters
WoS Q Değeri
Q3
Scopus Q Değeri
Q2
Cilt
99
Sayı
2
