On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
dc.WoS.categories | Economics | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Sanver, M. Remzi | |
dc.contributor.author | Chatterji, Shurojit | |
dc.contributor.author | Sen, Arunava | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-24T12:14:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-24T12:14:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-05 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we investigate domains that admit "well-behaved" strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982) [13]. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.fullTextLevel | Full Text | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84877603608 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11411/3289 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005 | |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000319790200006 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wosquality | Q3 | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Web of Science | en_US |
dc.indekslendigikaynak | Scopus | en_US |
dc.issue | 3 | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.national | International | en_US |
dc.numberofauthors | 3 | en_US |
dc.pages | 1050-1073 | en_US |
dc.publisher | Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | en_US |
dc.subject | Restricted domains | en_US |
dc.subject | Semi-single-peaked domains | en_US |
dc.title | On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.volume | 148 | en_US |